Capital Flows to Latin America (2003–17): A Critical Survey from Prebisch’s Business Cycle Theory

ABSTRACT

The economic literature on capital flows to developing countries has shared two important commonalities since the 1990s. Published works (whether they focus on the external situation or stress the domestic determinants of capital flows) tend to assume a beneficial effect of capital inflows, which leads to an improvement of peripheral institutions, whose deficiencies are ostensibly the main cause of economic turmoil and/or failure in attracting capital flows, in continuity with New Institutional Economics. In doing so, mainstream economists deliberately overlook the asymmetric characteristics of the international monetary system and the persisting hegemony of dollar. Raul Prebisch’s pioneering work on business cycles in Latin America provide an alternative view, one capable of amending the existing mainstream literature. On the one hand, Prebisch stressed the destabilizing role of capital inflows on Latin American economies, particularly short-term speculative capital. On the other hand, Prebisch designed a set of counter cyclical monetary policies in order to contrast capital volatility, particularly during downturns. An analysis of stylized facts shows that, when correctly updated, Prebisch’s theory has remarkable explanatory potential when applied to Latin America’s current economic and financial situation.     

Decomposing financial (in)stability in emerging economies

The analysis of the build-up of risks in emerging economies have traditionally been scarce and focused mostly on external risks, despite the recent substantial development of their financial system. This paper builds an index of financial vulnerabilities tailored to emerging economies, grouping 32 indicators around four poles: valuation and risk appetite, imbalances in the non-financial sector, financial sector vulnerabilities, and global vulnerabilities. It adopts a model-free approach, purposely departing from early warning models or complex econometric constructs, and rely on data made already available by international organisations. Our index of financial vulnerabilities enables a granular mapping of where risk originates and how it spreads to other parts of the financial system. Using various data visualisation tools and benefitting from the flexibility of our index’s methodology, we are able build a narrative of the evolution of financial stability in emerging economies from 2005 to 2015. Finally, we also discuss the relation between our index and both the business cycle (proxied by GDP) and the credit cycle (proxied by the credit-to-GDP gap).     

Interenterprise Credit and Adjustment during Financial Crises: The Role of Firm Size

Small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) suffered a sharp contraction in their borrowing from banks during the Great Recession. Analyzing a large firm‐level database for European countries, the paper shows that trade credit amplified the liquidity squeeze on SMEs, with adverse effects on their real activity. SMEs sharply increased their net trade credit and thus transferred financial resources to larger firms. Given the large weight of SMEs in the economy of European countries, the liquidity squeeze of SMEs likely contributed to the depth of the output fall and the slow recovery in Europe during the Great Recession.     

美国需求端产业结构的变化及对中国的启示

对产业结构演化的研究都是从供给端计算的产业结构，本文构造了从需求端计算的产业结构并依此对美国需求端产业结构的演化进行了实证分析。研究表明，当年价所计算的美国需求端三次产业结构的变化小于供给端产业结构的变化；1970年以来美国第二产业的变化差异中近40%可以用外贸因素来解释。进而本文采取不变价计算了美国产业结构的变化，研究表明，自1970年以来按不变价计算的美国需求端的产业结构变化很小，且美国第三产业比例提升中有31%可以用不同产业价格因素变化来解释，44%可以用国际贸易来解释，仅有25%可以用第三产业收入弹性的变化来解释，因而收入弹性不是美国第三产业比例提升的重要原因。美国能够维持经常账户的逆差，将第三产业作为动力产业的根本原因在于美元的霸权地位。相比较而言，中国一直以来处于国际收支“双顺差”的状态，中国的具体国情和国家实力均无法满足大规模输出人民币使之成为其他国家储备货币的条件。     

Political booms and currency crises

This paper shows evidence that political booms, defined as the rise in governments’ popularity, are associated with a higher likelihood of currency crises. The reasoning behind this finding is that prudent economic policies to address underlying weaknesses in the economy may be political costly for incumbent governments in the short-term. Hence, popularity-concerned governments may not have enough incentives to take such corrective actions in a timely manner. This approach, in turn, can deteriorate economic fundamentals and increase related risks in the economy which can eventually lead to crises. This paper sheds light on this phenomenon in the case of currency crises, suggesting that currency crises can be viewed as “political booms gone bust” events. Moreover, it finds that higher international reserves, higher exports, and a higher degree of financial openness alleviate the effect of political booms on currency crises.     

Failure to learn from failure: The 2008 mortgage crisis as a déjà vu of the mortgage meltdown of 1994

This article traces the developments in the market for residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS) during the period 1970–2008. Drawing on an analysis of trade publications, business press, and interviews with practitioners, it shows that an MBS market meltdown in 1994 provided clear signals of problems with MBS. The market participants did not re-evaluate their use of risk management tools or adjust security design in response to the 1994 crisis, suggesting a lack of understanding of the implications of the crisis. The 1994 meltdown showed that MBS were vulnerable to systematic risks and that these risks could precipitate an MBS market crash. Furthermore, the 1994 meltdown demonstrated that large-scale investment in MBS could affect the primary mortgage market, thereby rendering the MBS risks unpredictable. After 1994, MBS investment shifted to MBS backed by mortgages with default risk – a development that led to the crash of 2008. By drawing parallels between the 1994 and 2008 crises, this article shows how the MBS market failed to self-correct. The results suggest that financial market participants do not always incorporate relevant information in their decision-making and that market participants have difficulties in both foreseeing the effect of financial innovations on markets and interpreting these effects.     

Did taxes,decrees or credibility drive money? Early nineteenth century Finland from a chartalist perspective

Chartalist theories assume the government determines the currency used by the public. Finland’s experience following the Russo-Swedish war in 1808–1809 would seem to contradict the chartalist view. Having become a Grand Duchy under Russia, the Finnish Government sought to replace Swedish riksdalers in circulation with roubles. However, due to a resilient trade surplus with Sweden and the resulting flood of Swedish money into Finland, bans on the riksdaler were largely ineffective. Taxation proved a particularly clumsy tool for leveraging the switch to roubles. Taxpayers almost forced the government to accept payments in a foreign currency. Even the government had to use Swedish money. Issuing roubles was of limited use. As a result, the rouble failed to establish itself as Finland’s main currency until the introduction of a silver standard in 1840–1842.     

Extending the determinants of currency substitution in Nigeria: Any role for financial innovation?

Existing literature suggests that macroeconomic and institutional factors are the drivers of currency substitution. The persistent and significant incidence of currency substitution during the period of mixed performance of macroeconomic variables suggests the existence of a knowledge gap on the drivers of currency substitution during the era of rapid technological innovation. To contribute to this literature, we augmented the traditional money demand model of the determinants of currency substitution to introduce financial innovation. We use Nigerian data from 2005Q1 to 2019Q4 and Pesaran et al. (2001, https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.616 ) autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bound test approach to cointegration to estimate the models. The results confirm the presence of short-run and long-run relationships between financial technology and currency substitution in Nigeria. In effect, the deployment of financial technology in developing payment system infrastructure creates additional incentives for economic agents to hold foreign currency deposit. Economic managers must, therefore, mainstream credible monetary and fiscal policies to moderate the effect of financial innovation on currency substitution.     

The South African Financial Cycle and its Relation to Household Deleveraging

This paper considers the extent to which South African households have deleveraged, since the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. We extend the official South African Reserve Bank business cycle methodology to date financial cycles, from which we identify the peaks and troughs of the South African financial cycle going back to 1966. Our composite financial cycle index peaks in April 1974, January 1984 and May 2007; it has bottomed out in July 1979 and February 1999. Thus, we still await the trough. We further compare and contrast the deleveraging process in the current downward phase to the experiences from previous financial cycles. We find that the average period of the financial cycle in South Africa is much longer (approximately 17.3 years) than that of the business cycle (approximately 5.8 years), and that deleveraging has not yet matched the degree of deleveraging seen in previous downward phases. Our results suggest that further deleveraging is necessary, before we can expect to turn the financial corner.     

Does more finance mean more inequality in times of crisis?

Many recent empirical studies show that both banking crises and financial development (FD) play an important role in understanding the dynamics of income inequality (IncI) over the last decades. However, so far no study has investigated the role of FD in the amplification of IncI following banking crises. This paper seeks to address this issue based on a sample of 69 banking crises in 54 countries over the 1977–2013 period. Our analysis suggests that FD is associated with a significant increase in IncI in the aftermath of banking crises. This result is robust to a broad range of alternative specifications and is unaffected by various potential sources of endogeneity. We also show that the relationship between FD and the redistributive consequences of banking crises is not subject to a threshold effect and is stronger for developing countries.